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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
______________ 
 
No. 13-1902 
_____________ 
  
WAYNE S. LIPSCOMB, 
 as administratrix of the Estate of Moses Walker, Jr., 
 on behalf of his decedents heirs-at-law and next-of-kin, 
                                                                       Appellant 
  
v. 
  
PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION & PAROLE;  
MICHAEL POTTEIGER, individually and in his official capacity  
as Chairman of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole;  
JUAN RODRIGUEZ, individually and in his official capacity as an  
agent with the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole;  
ROSA HERNANDEZ, individually and in her capacity as an  
agent with the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole;  
MICHELLE RIVERA, individually and in her official capacity as an  
agent with the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole  
_____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN 
DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 (E.D. Pa. No. 2-12-cv-06373) 
District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle, III 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 5, 2013 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 30, 2014) 
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______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
  
 Plaintiff-Appellant Wayne S. Lipscomb ( “Appellant”), on behalf of the Estate of 
Moses Walker, Jr. (“Officer Walker”),  appeals the District Court’s dismissal of claims 
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Jose Rodriguez (“Officer Rodriguez”), Michael 
C. Potteiger, Rosa Hernandez, Michelle Rivera, and the Pennsylvania Board of Probation 
and Parole (collectively, the “Defendants”).  For the reasons discussed below, we will 
affirm the District Court.  
I. BACKGROUND 
   Because we write primarily for the parties who are familiar with the facts and 
procedural history, we recount only the essential facts.  On October 16, 2011, Rafael 
Jones (“Jones”) was released from state prison after serving the maximum sentence for 
carrying a firearm without a license, at which point his three-year probationary period 
began.  In February of 2012, Jones was arrested and charged with robbing a man at 
gunpoint in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, which violated the terms of his probation.  At a 
probation hearing, the presiding judge indicated that Jones’ supervising probation officer, 
Officer Rodriguez, should “drop the detainer,” or seek to have Jones re-incarcerated, if 
Jones violated the terms of his probation by testing positive during one of his weekly 
drug tests.  The presiding judge also required Defendants to place Jones on house arrest 
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and under electronic monitoring for a period of six months.  Despite the District Court’s 
order, Defendants never effectuated Jones’ house arrest or electronic monitoring.  Within 
a month, Jones failed a drug test.  On August 15, 2012, Defendants denied Officer 
Rodriguez’s request for a warrant to arrest Jones for the positive drug test and probation 
violation.  Three days later, on August 18, 2012, Jones tragically shot and killed Officer 
Walker, a Philadelphia police officer with a distinguished career of public service.   
 Appellant, on behalf of Walker, subsequently filed suit claiming, inter alia, that, 
pursuant to § 1983, Defendants denied Officer Walker substantive due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment by not protecting Officer Walker from harm ultimately inflicted 
by Jones.  The District Court granted all of Defendants’ motions to dismiss. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 
F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2010).  We will determine that a motion to dismiss is properly 
granted “only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and 
viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, [we] find[] that plaintiff’s claims 
lack facial plausibility.”  Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A.  State-Created Danger Theory 
 Appellant argues that Defendants set forth and executed a policy whereby they 
“designate[d] specific dates/times during which they [would] not seek and/or issue arrest 
warrants for probation/parole violations.”  (Appellant Br. 11.)  This policy was allegedly 
designed to “give the appearance that the recidivism rates for probation/parole violations 
are lower than what they would otherwise be.”  (Id.)  In accordance with this policy, 
Defendants, according to Appellant, failed to arrest Jones for his probation violation.  The  
failure to arrest Jones allegedly created the circumstances leading to Officer Walker’s 
demise.   
 In Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1201 (3d Cir. 1996), we first adopted the state-
created danger theory as another avenue to remedy a constitutional violation in suits 
brought under § 1983.  Under Kneipp, liability may attach where the state acts to create 
or enhance a danger that deprives a plaintiff of his Fourteenth Amendment right to 
substantive due process.  Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1205; see also Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 
160, 177-79 (3d Cir. 2013).  To prevail on this theory, a plaintiff must prove the 
following four elements: 1) the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct; 
2) a state actor acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience; 3) a 
relationship between the state and the plaintiff existed such that the plaintiff was a 
foreseeable victim of the defendant’s acts, or a member of a discrete class of persons 
subjected to the potential harm brought about by the state’s actions, as opposed to a 
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member of the public in general; and 4) a state actor affirmatively used his or her 
authority in a way that created a danger to the citizen or that rendered the citizen more 
vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted at all.  Id. 
 In the case at bar, the District Court dismissed all claims brought under § 1983 
against each of the Defendants pursuant to the state-created danger theory.  We will 
affirm. 
 “[T]he first inquiry in any 1983 suit . . . is whether the plaintiff has been deprived 
of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”  Martinez v. 
California, 44 U.S. 277, 284 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The answer to 
that inquiry disposes of this case.  Id.  In Martinez, the complaint alleged that the State of 
California had released on parole a person who had been convicted of attempted rape.  
444 U.S. at 279.  The parolee had been committed to a state mental hospital and then 
sentenced to twenty years in state prison.  Id.  After five years, he was released on parole 
and five months later murdered a fifteen-year-old girl.  Id. at 279-80.   
In upholding the dismissal of the complaint against the state as not stating a claim 
under § 1983, the Supreme Court explained that the fifteen-year-old girl’s “life was taken 
by the parolee . . . after his release,” he “was in no sense an agent of the parole board,” 
and “the parole board was not aware that [the girl], as distinguished from the public at 
large, faced any special danger.”  Id. at 285.  Thus, the Supreme Court determined that 
since the girl’s “death is too remote a consequence of the parole officers’ action to hold 
them responsible under the federal civil rights law,” it could not be said that the officers 
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themselves, in a constitutional sense, deprived the decedent of her life.  Id. 
 In the instant case, as in Martinez, Defendants’ actions cannot be said to have 
deprived Officer Walker of his life.  Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. at 283-85.  Even 
assuming that the officers could have, but did not, cause Jones to be arrested on or before 
August 18, 2012, the killing of Officer Walker by Jones is too remote a consequence of 
the failure to arrest Jones to constitute a cognizable “deprivation” by Defendants under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.   See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Social Servs., 
489 U.S. 189, 197 n.4 (1989) (explaining that in Martinez, “we affirmed the dismissal of 
the claim on the . . . ground that the causal connection between the state officials’ 
decision to release the parolee from prison and the murder was too attenuated to establish 
a ‘deprivation’ of constitutional rights within the meaning of § 1983”); Martinez v. 
California, 444 U.S. at 284-85 (“Although the decision to release [the parolee] from 
prison was action by the State, the action of [the parolee] five months later cannot be 
fairly characterized as state action.”). 
 In its opinion, the District Court concluded that, even “assuming that all the other 
elements [of the state-created danger theory] . . . have been satisfied,” the third element 
was not met because “any threat [Defendants] created was to the general population and 
not simply to a discrete individual or discrete class of individuals.”  (App. 11 (citing 
Morse v. Lower Merion School District, 132 F.3d 902, 913 (3d Cir. 1997).)  Appellant 
argues that the District Court erred in so ruling, for police officers are “a distinct class of 
individuals” who “are at a greater risk than the general public within the context of a[n 
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encounter with a] parolee . . .”  (Appellant Br. 28.)  We disagree.  There is no case law 
support for this proposition and we decline to expand the state-created danger theory by 
ruling in accordance with Appellant’s assertion. 
B.  Qualified Immunity 
 Defendants argue that we can affirm the District Court’s ruling on qualified 
immunity grounds, (see, e.g., Appellee Hernandez Br. 13-15), because “government 
officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil 
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”  Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  However, “it is not necessary for us to decide any 
question concerning the immunity of state parole officials as a matter of federal law,” 
given that Defendants did not deprive Officer Walker of a right secured by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States.  Martinez, 444 U.S. at 584.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the § 
1983 claims as against each of the Defendants.  
